The proof
Exported from VeraSnap in one of three formats: a shareable proof JSON (proof_version 1.2), the internal proof.json, or an Evidence Pack ZIP that bundles the photo or video with its proof.json.
Verification guide · CPP proofs
A VeraSnap proof is a small file that travels with a photo or video. You can check it in the app, with the open-source Verify SDK, or by hand with OpenSSL. No account is needed, and the SDK and OpenSSL run offline on your own machine.
What you need
Exported from VeraSnap in one of three formats: a shareable proof JSON (proof_version 1.2), the internal proof.json, or an Evidence Pack ZIP that bundles the photo or video with its proof.json.
Not a screenshot, and not a copy re-saved by a messaging app or social network. Re-encoding changes the bytes that were hashed, so the check fails even when nothing visible changed. If you received a re-sent copy, ask for the original or the Evidence Pack.
Proofs shared from VeraSnap for iOS 1.6 or later (and Android 1.6.1) contain the signed event as raw_event, so its hash can be recomputed. Proofs shared by older versions do not, and can be at most partially verified.
Three ways
All three run the same checks: the file against the signed hash, the signature, the timestamp and the batch it was anchored in. The SDK follows the rules of the VeraSnap 1.6.1 apps.
01 · APP
Open the Verify tab. Choose the proof file, paste the JSON, or scan a VeraSnap QR code. Add the original photo or video to check the file itself.
iOS · Android · free
02 · SDK
Open-source Python verifier (Apache-2.0, alpha). It makes no network requests while verifying and prints a colour, a status code and every check. Exit codes: 0 green, 1 yellow, 2 red, 3 input error.
python -m pip install "verasnap-verify @ git+https://github.com/veritaschain/verasnap-verify-sdk.git@5b19884061729c1aadbf3f22daab133c42082ede"
verasnap-verify verify proof.json --media photo.jpg03 · OPENSSL
Every step uses standard building blocks — SHA-256, ECDSA P-256 and RFC 3161 — so you can check a proof without any VeraSnap software. Commands are below.
OpenSSL 3 · jq · Python 3
Reading the result
The colours below follow VeraSnap 1.6.1 and the Verify SDK. Earlier app versions show some cases differently: for example, iOS 1.6 can show a valid proof signed on another phone as green.
The file matches the signed hash, the signature is valid, the signing key is known to the verifier, the timestamp's signature and certificate chain check out, and the timestamp was obtained within 60 minutes of the recorded capture time.
The capture time itself is still the phone's clock. Green does not mean the scene is real.
ANCHOR_VERIFIED
Common reasons: the proof was signed on someone else's phone, so the key is unknown to you; the timestamp was obtained more than 60 minutes after the recorded capture (for example, the photo was taken offline); the timestamp authority's root is not trusted; the batch's Merkle proof is missing; or no timestamp has been obtained yet.
Yellow is not "fake". A genuine proof from another person's phone is normally yellow, unless your organisation has enrolled that phone's key.
PARTIALLY_VERIFIED · ANCHOR_PENDING
The file was edited, re-encoded or swapped; the signature does not verify; or the proof or its timestamp was altered, swapped or removed.
HASH_MISMATCH · SIGNATURE_INVALID · ERROR
The CPP specification asks verifiers to say it plainly: This shows capture provenance. It does NOT verify content truthfulness or signer identity.
(CPP v1.1 §12)
By hand
For a shareable proof (proof_version 1.2 with raw_event). Replace proof.json and photo.jpg with your files. Tested on 18 Nov 2026 with OpenSSL 3.0.13, jq 1.7 and Python 3 on a test proof from the SDK. macOS ships LibreSSL as openssl; the commands were not tested with it.
The readable event section is a copy for display. The signature covers raw_event, so take every value from there.
jq -r .raw_event proof.json | base64 -d > event.jsonSHA-256 of the signed event must equal event_hash.
openssl dgst -sha256 event.json
jq -r .event_hash proof.jsonSHA-256 of the original file must equal the AssetHash inside the signed event. This is the step that catches edits, re-encoding and swapped files.
openssl dgst -sha256 photo.jpg
jq -r .Asset.AssetHash event.jsonES256 (ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256) over the signed event. The public key in the proof is a raw P-256 point, so put the standard key header in front of it first. If the signature is 64 bytes instead of DER, use the SDK.
{ echo MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgA= | base64 -d; jq -r .public_key proof.json | base64 -d; } > pub.der
openssl pkey -pubin -inform DER -in pub.der -out pub.pem
jq -r .signature.value proof.json | sed 's/^es256://' | base64 -d > sig.der
openssl dgst -sha256 -verify pub.pem -signature sig.der event.jsonExpected: Verified OK
A valid signature shows that the event was signed with this key and has not changed since. It does not show whose key it is.
The leaf is SHA-256 of the event hash bytes; parents are SHA-256 of left‖right, with no prefix bytes (CPP v1.3 §2, v1.4 Appendix C). Save this as merkle.py:
import hashlib, json, sys
p = json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); tp = p["timestamp_proof"]
h = lambda s: bytes.fromhex(s.removeprefix("sha256:"))
node = hashlib.sha256(h(p["event_hash"])).digest() # leaf = SHA-256(EventHash)
i = tp.get("merkle_index", 0)
for sib in tp.get("merkle_proof", []): # bottom to top
node = hashlib.sha256(node + h(sib) if i % 2 == 0 else h(sib) + node).digest()
i //= 2
print("OK" if node == h(tp["merkle_root"]) else "MISMATCH")python3 merkle.py proof.jsonExpected: OK
The RFC 3161 token must be issued for the Merkle root itself (CPP v1.3 §5) and chain to a root you trust. tsa_roots.pem is the set bundled with the Verify SDK; you can use your own.
curl -sO https://raw.githubusercontent.com/veritaschain/verasnap-verify-sdk/5b19884061729c1aadbf3f22daab133c42082ede/src/verasnap_verify/data/tsa_roots.pem
jq -r .timestamp_proof.token proof.json | base64 -d > token.der
ROOT=$(jq -r .timestamp_proof.merkle_root proof.json | sed 's/^sha256://')
openssl ts -verify -in token.der -token_in -digest "$ROOT" -CAfile tsa_roots.pem
openssl ts -reply -in token.der -token_in -text | grep "Time stamp"Expected: Verification: OK, then the authority's time.
The capture time in the signed event is the phone's clock. VeraSnap treats a timestamp obtained more than 60 minutes after it as "capture time not confirmed", and a capture time more than 5 minutes after the timestamp as a clock problem.
jq -r .Timestamp event.jsonNot covered here: whether the key belongs to a particular phone (that needs key enrolment — see the insurer page), the internal proof.json format, and the chain context, whose deletion counts are not signed. The SDK handles all three; its result codes are listed in docs/RESULTS.md.
FAQ
No. The Verify SDK and the OpenSSL steps run on your own machine and make no network requests while verifying (fetching the root file above is a one-time download).
Not necessarily. Yellow means nothing failed but something could not be confirmed. The most common case is a genuine proof signed on someone else's phone: the signature is valid, but your verifier does not know that key. Read the warnings — each one names what could not be confirmed.
Most messaging apps and social networks re-compress photos. The picture looks the same, but the bytes differ, so the hash no longer matches. Ask the sender for the original file or for the Evidence Pack ZIP.
The proof was signed with a key your verifier has not registered. Organisations that receive proofs regularly can enrol a phone's key with hardware attestation (Android Key Attestation or Apple App Attest) using the Verify SDK; proofs from enrolled phones can then be green. See VeraSnap for insurers.
The iOS app can also export a C2PA manifest, signed with a key created on the device. C2PA tools judge that signer against their own trust lists. The checks on this page, and the colours above, are based on the CPP proof.
No. It shows that the file has not changed since it was signed and that a timestamp authority saw it by a certain time. What the picture shows, and whether the scene was staged, is outside what a capture proof can establish.
Available now · free download
iOS 26.0+ · ANDROID