VERASNAPby VeritasChain
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For engineers · Capture Provenance Profile

What VeraSnap implements — and what it does not.

VeraSnap implements the Capture Provenance Profile (CPP), an open specification published by the VeritasChain Standards Organization (VSO). This page lists the parts of CPP v1.4 that VeraSnap follows, where it differs, and the gaps that are still open.

Page v1.0 · Updated 18 Nov 2026 · Proof format of VeraSnap 1.6 / 1.6.1 · Verification rules of 1.6.1

Status

Which documents, and how far along.

Specification status as of 18 November 2026
DocumentStatusDate
CPP v1.4Released (tag 1.4) — the current version. Depth Analysis Extension and multi-platform support on top of v1.3.2026-01-29
CPP v1.5Not released — Pre-Publish Verification Extension. No tagged release.2026-01-30
draft-vso-cpp-core-04Individual Internet-Draft, intended status Experimental. Not adopted by any IETF working group; no standing in the IETF standards process.posted 2026-10-24
VAP v1.2Parent framework, Draft 3. The CPP mapping to VAP v1.2 is not yet published, so CPP is not described as VAP v1.2 conformant.—
First-party implementation. VeraSnap is developed by VeritasChain Co., Ltd., which operates VSO; the two share a founder. The CPP repository's disclosure dated 25 October 2026 reports no external implementations of CPP and no Evidence Pack accepted in any proceeding.

Pipeline

From shutter to proof, in six steps.

  1. Event

    Each capture creates an INGEST event: the SHA-256 of the file bytes (AssetHash), the device clock time, a PrevHash link to the previous event in the chain (CPP v1.1 §9), camera settings and sensor data. Location, when enabled, is stored only as hashes of the coordinates. Depth analysis and a biometric record are optional.

  2. EventHash

    SHA-256 over the event serialized with JSON Canonicalization (RFC 8785), excluding EventHash and Signature (CPP v1.1 §6.1). Shareable proofs carry the exact signed bytes as raw_event, so a verifier hashes bytes instead of re-canonicalizing.

  3. Signature

    ES256 (ECDSA P-256) over the EventHash. The key is generated on the device — the Secure Enclave on iOS, Android Keystore (StrongBox if available, otherwise TEE) on Android 1.6.1 — and the public key is exported as an X9.63 point.

  4. Merkle batch

    Leaf = SHA-256(EventHash bytes); parent = SHA-256(left‖right); the leaf list is padded to a power of two by repeating the last leaf; the proof runs bottom to top and the index parity picks the side (CPP v1.3 §2, v1.4 Appendix C). A one-event tree has root = leaf.

  5. RFC 3161 timestamp

    Only the Merkle root is sent: the TimeStampReq's SHA-256 messageImprint is the root itself, with no further hashing (CPP v1.3 §4.3, §5.1), and certReq is set. The apps try rfc3161.ai.moda, DigiCert, Sectigo and FreeTSA in that order.

  6. Export

    Shareable proof JSON (snake_case, proof_version 1.2, with raw_event, timestamp_proof and chain_context), internal proof.json (PascalCase), Evidence Pack ZIP (media plus proof.json), and on iOS a C2PA manifest.

Conformance

Against the CPP v1.4 §8 components.

CPP v1.4 §8.1 components and VeraSnap 1.6 / 1.6.1
ComponentVeraSnapNotes
CoreYesINGEST events, JCS + SHA-256 EventHash, ES256, PrevHash chain, TOMBSTONE events for deletions (CPP v1.1 §9.3). Canonicalization edge cases differ from RFC 8785 — see Differences.
TSAYesRFC 3161. Since 1.6 the verifier checks the timestamp authority's signature and certificate chain, not only the time value.
MerkleYesCPP v1.3 construction, single-leaf and batch.
DepthiOS onlyOptional Depth Analysis Extension with screen detection, shown as a likelihood (v1.4 §10.1). Not in the Android 1.6.1 rebuild.
AttestationRecorded, not verifiedAttested Capture records a Face ID / Touch ID result; it does not identify the person. Device attestation written in a proof is reported as stated, not verified.

We do not claim a conformance level. CPP v1.4 has no published conformance test suite, and VeraSnap has not been independently assessed. The Bronze / Silver / Gold badges in the app are the superseded level names of CPP v1.0–v1.1 and do not correspond to the v1.4 levels.

Verification rules

How a result is decided (1.6.1).

The iOS 1.6.1 verifier, the Android 1.6.1 port and the Verify SDK share these rules; the SDK documents a few deliberate differences, for example for the internal proof.json. It names each check with a stable id.

CheckRule
event_hashRecomputed from raw_event. A shareable proof without raw_event gets a warning (format checked only).
signatureES256 over the recomputed EventHash, never over the value written in the JSON.
signer_keyA valid signature by a key the verifier does not know is a warning, with the key fingerprint. By default the app knows only its own key; the SDK knows keys an organisation enrolled.
media_hashThe file against the signed AssetHash. Skipped when no file is supplied, and the result says so.
merkle_inclusionEvent included in the anchored root. A batch anchor without its proof is a warning.
message_imprint, tsa_signature, timestampThe token was issued for this root; CMS signature and chain to a trusted root. The time shown comes only from a fully verified token. FreeTSA is not trusted by default.
capture_timeTimestamp more than 60 minutes after the signed capture time, or capture time more than 5 minutes after the timestamp: warning.
attestation, human_attestationReported as stated; never counted towards green. A biometric record counts only when the signing key is known.
chain_contextDeletion counts are shown as a hint. They are not covered by the signature.

Overall: any failure is red; no failure but a warning, or no fully verified timestamp, is yellow; otherwise green. Full list of codes: docs/RESULTS.md. Step-by-step manual checks: Verify a proof.

Differences

Where VeraSnap differs from the released spec.

Chain context and deletion counts

Each proof carries a chain context: total events, tombstone count and an XOR-based completeness value. This follows the Chain Context of draft-vso-cpp-core-04 §4.8. It is not part of released CPP v1.4, where the XOR invariant of v1.0 was removed in v1.1. The counts are not signed.

Merkle domain separation

VeraSnap follows CPP v1.3/v1.4: no 0x00 / 0x01 prefixes. The Internet-Draft (§4.6.1) requires the prefixes and deprecates the construction the apps use. Proofs made by the apps up to 1.6.1 use the v1.4 construction.

Canonicalization edge cases

The iOS canonicalizer departs from RFC 8785 in a few cases (some 0/1 numbers written as false/true, a carriage return written as \u000d, Swift's number formatting). Android 1.6.1 and the Verify SDK reproduce them byte for byte; raw_event lets verifiers avoid the issue.

Result wording

CPP's UI guidelines prefer "Provenance Available" to "Verified" (v1.1 §12). The apps call a yellow result "Partially Verified" and use verification language for green. Since 1.6.1 the green message says only that the proof meets VeraSnap's verification criteria, and that the capture time is the device clock's value.

Known gaps

Open items, stated plainly.

  • Chain context is unsigned. Editing it can hide a deletion warning. Deletions after anchoring remain detectable against the anchored batch; events removed before anchoring, and captures never recorded, leave nothing to detect.
  • Device attestation is not verified by the apps' verifier, and per-capture App Attest assertions are not checked by the SDK. Keys can be tied to a device only through enrolment with the Verify SDK (Android Key Attestation, Apple App Attest).
  • Capture time is the device clock. An NTP consistency reading is recorded, but it is not a proof. The RFC 3161 time bounds the capture from above.
  • Screen detection is a likelihood. Printed photos and flat subjects can be classified as screens, and curved or reflective screens can be missed (v1.4 §9.1).
  • Android 1.6.1 (a rebuild that follows iOS) does not yet include video capture, C2PA export, cases or depth/screen detection. Google Play currently distributes the 1.5 line.
  • Older shared proofs (before iOS 1.6, and from Android 1.5.x) lack raw_event, so their EventHash cannot be recomputed.

The Verify SDK keeps its own list: docs/LIMITATIONS.md.

Tests

Cross-platform checks (first-party).

  • The same 28 insurance-fraud scenarios (S01–S28: edited, re-compressed and swapped photos, forged proofs, backdating, removed parts, batch anchoring) run on iOS 1.6.1 and Android 1.6.1 with the same fixtures; every status and every failed or warned check matches.
  • 12 proofs made by the Android 1.6.1 code path with real RFC 3161 tokens verify on iOS 1.6.1: green with the key known, yellow with an unknown key, red with another photo.
  • The Verify SDK runs 125 tests, including 31 scenarios with real tokens from rfc3161.ai.moda, DigiCert and Sectigo. Scenario S01 was also checked independently with OpenSSL.

All of these are first-party tests run by VeritasChain. They are not an independent audit or a conformance test suite.

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