VERASNAPby VeritasChain

For insurers · claim photo verification Is this claim photo still the one that was taken?

VeraSnap Verify SDK checks, on your own servers, a claim photo and its capture proof. It does not replace post-hoc detection of AI-edited images; it adds a layer in front of it that tells, with certainty, which photos were sealed at capture and arrived unchanged.

VERIFY SDK FREE · APACHE-2.0 — CAPTURE SDK BY PoC (DESIGN STAGE)

Verify SDK 0.1.0 Apache-2.0 Python 3.10+ RFC 3161 · Key Attestation · App Attest

The problem

Post-hoc detection gives probabilities. A seal at capture gives match or no match.

Claims with AI-painted damage, or with photos re-used from social media or older claims, are reported in Japan and abroad. In 2026 Japanese non-life insurers began analysing submitted images after the fact for traces of generative AI and for re-use.[1][2] Post-hoc detection can run on every photo, but its answers are probabilities and it has to keep pace with image generators. A photo sealed at capture fails verification if a single bit changes, and that does not weaken as generators improve. But only photos taken with a sealing camera can be sealed.

[1] Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance / Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance, release of 3 Aug 2026 (PDF, Japanese) [2] Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance, release of 30 Sep 2026 (PDF, Japanese)

How to use it

Not instead of post-hoc detection. In front of it.

  1. 01 — SEALED

    Fast track

    Photos taken on an enrolled device whose proof verifies green. Fast-track them and leave them out of post-hoc AI checks.

    Verify SDK · green

  2. 02 — UNSEALED

    As today

    Photos from the camera roll, LINE or the web. They go to your existing post-hoc detection, unchanged.

    Existing detection

  3. 03 — DOUBTFUL

    Retake

    Only for high-value or flagged claims: ask for new photos taken with the capture SDK in your app.

    Capture SDK (PoC)

  4. 04 — RECORD

    Audit trail

    Store the result and every check with the claim. The handler makes the decision.

    JSON · auditable

What the SDK checks

Six checks, all offline, all auditable.

Changed since capture?

The photo's SHA-256 must match the event signed by the device key. Re-compression, cropping or a swapped photo is red.

SHA-256 · ES256

Independent timestamp

RFC 3161 tokens verified down to the CMS signature, ESSCertID, EKU and the certificate chain at genTime. Only a verified time is returned.

RFC 3161 · RFC 5816

Enrolled device keys

Android Key Attestation and Apple App Attest let you enroll only keys that your app created on a genuine device. Proofs from other keys do not turn green.

Key Attestation · App Attest

Capture time consistency

If the timestamp came more than 60 minutes after the recorded capture time, the result is yellow. The capture time is treated as the device clock's value.

Same rule as the apps

Batches and deletions

Inclusion in offline Merkle batches is verified. Deletions recorded in the capture history are shown as an unsigned hint.

Merkle · chain context

Nothing leaves your servers

Verification needs only the proof and the file. No image is sent anywhere.

No network at verify

Honest coverage

What it catches, and what it cannot.

Results for photos that carry a proof. For photos without one, the SDK says nothing.

AttackResultWhy
AI edit or inpainting after captureRedThe photo's hash no longer matches the signature.
Re-compression, cropping, a swapped photoRedSame.
A forged proof made with the attacker's own key and a genuine timestampYellowSignature and timestamp are valid, but the key is not enrolled. It can never be green.
Backdating the capture timeYellowThe timestamp is more than 60 minutes after the recorded capture time.
Swapping or stripping the timestamp, editing the proofRedmessageImprint, Merkle root or signature no longer match.
Someone else's photo, a social-media imageNo greenIt cannot be sealed by an enrolled key, so no green proof can exist for it.
Staged damage, another vehicleNot detectedA real camera pointed at a false scene verifies. Combine with loss adjusting.
Re-photographing an image on a screenNot judgedThe apps' screen checks are recorded as hints; the SDK does not use them.
Rooted devices, virtual-camera injectionPartlyAndroid enrollment requires verified boot and a locked bootloader. Jailbreaks on iOS are not reliably detected.
Inflated damage by a repair shop or agentNot detectedA proof shows only that the business took the photo at that time.

Results

Three colours, and a list of checks you can audit.

Green

ANCHOR_VERIFIED

Unchanged since capture, signed by an enrolled key, timestamp fully verified within 60 minutes of the recorded capture time.

Yellow

PARTIALLY_VERIFIED · ANCHOR_PENDING

Nothing failed, but something could not be confirmed: an unknown key, a late timestamp, an untrusted TSA.

Red

SIGNATURE_INVALID · HASH_MISMATCH · ERROR

The photo does not match its proof, or the proof was altered.

A forged proof — AI image, attacker's own key, genuine timestamp — comes out yellow, not green:

YELLOW PARTIALLY_VERIFIED Partially verified. Signed with a key that is not enrolled (key 46fe4317c5693717). The signature is valid, but it does not show which device or app made it. [PASS] parse Shareable proof, version 1.2. [PASS] event_hash EventHash matches the signed event. [PASS] signature ES256 signature is valid. [WARN] signer_key Signed with a key that is not enrolled (key 46fe4317c5693717). The signature is valid, but it does not show which device or app made it. [PASS] media_hash The photo matches the signed hash. [PASS] merkle_inclusion The event is included in the anchored Merkle root (tree size 1). [PASS] message_imprint The timestamp was issued for this proof's anchored digest. [PASS] tsa_signature Timestamp signature and certificate chain are valid (CN=DigiCert SHA256 RSA4096 Timestamp Responder 2026 1,O=DigiCert\, Inc.,C=US). [PASS] timestamp RFC 3161 timestamp from https://rfc3161.ai.moda at 2026-11-18T11:09:26Z. [PASS] capture_time The timestamp was obtained 45 s after the recorded capture time. The capture time itself is the device clock's value. [INFO] attestation Attestation type APPLE_APP_ATTEST is stated in the proof but was not verified. [INFO] human_attestation A biometric check (FaceID) is recorded with result True. It is not counted because the signing key is not enrolled. It does not identify the photographer. signer key 46fe4317c5693717 known=False account=None timestamp 2026-11-18T11:09:26Z (CN=DigiCert SHA256 RSA4096 Timestamp Responder 2026 1,O=DigiCert\, Inc.,C=US) capture 2026-11-18T11:08:40.103Z (device clock, not proven)

Get started

A few lines in your claims backend.

# shell pip install git+https://github.com/veritaschain/verasnap-verify-sdk # Python: verify a claim photo from verasnap_verify import Verifier, SqliteKeyRegistry verifier = Verifier(registry=SqliteKeyRegistry("keys.sqlite")) result = verifier.verify(proof_bytes, media=photo_bytes) result.level # "green" | "yellow" | "red" result.checks # stable ids and codes result.timestamp_time # verified RFC 3161 time only result.signer.account_ref

Availability

What is ready today.

Verify SDK (Python)Available · 0.1.0 (alpha) · Apache-2.0
Device key enrollment (server-side checks for Android and iOS)Available, included in the SDK
Capture SDK (iOS Swift Package / Android AAR)Design stage · provided per PoC
Capture Environment Attestation (CPP v1.7: per-capture App Attest / Play Integrity)Specification drafted · not implemented
C2PA conformanceExpression of interest filed · not certified
Tests125, including 31 fraud scenarios with real timestamps, and tests against real Android attestation chains

Disclosure

What we do not claim.

The SDK is a first-party implementation by VeritasChain Co., Ltd., which shares a founder with the VeritasChain Standards Organization that publishes CPP. It has not been independently audited. As of 25 October 2026 there were no external implementations of CPP and no proof accepted in any proceeding (cpp-spec disclosure).

A proof shows when and on which device something was recorded, and that it has not changed since. It does not show that the picture is true, and it does not guarantee that a court, regulator or insurer will accept it.

Verify SDK 0.1.0 · free

Start with the test data.

The SDK ships with 31 fraud scenarios and genuine timestamps. For a capture-SDK PoC, or to connect it to your post-hoc detection, write to us.