Changed since capture?
The photo's SHA-256 must match the event signed by the device key. Re-compression, cropping or a swapped photo is red.
SHA-256 · ES256
VeraSnap Verify SDK checks, on your own servers, a claim photo and its capture proof. It does not replace post-hoc detection of AI-edited images; it adds a layer in front of it that tells, with certainty, which photos were sealed at capture and arrived unchanged.
VERIFY SDK FREE · APACHE-2.0 — CAPTURE SDK BY PoC (DESIGN STAGE)
The problem
Claims with AI-painted damage, or with photos re-used from social media or older claims, are reported in Japan and abroad. In 2026 Japanese non-life insurers began analysing submitted images after the fact for traces of generative AI and for re-use.[1][2] Post-hoc detection can run on every photo, but its answers are probabilities and it has to keep pace with image generators. A photo sealed at capture fails verification if a single bit changes, and that does not weaken as generators improve. But only photos taken with a sealing camera can be sealed.
[1] Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance / Aioi Nissay Dowa Insurance, release of 3 Aug 2026 (PDF, Japanese) [2] Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance, release of 30 Sep 2026 (PDF, Japanese)
How to use it
Photos taken on an enrolled device whose proof verifies green. Fast-track them and leave them out of post-hoc AI checks.
Verify SDK · green
Photos from the camera roll, LINE or the web. They go to your existing post-hoc detection, unchanged.
Existing detection
Only for high-value or flagged claims: ask for new photos taken with the capture SDK in your app.
Capture SDK (PoC)
Store the result and every check with the claim. The handler makes the decision.
JSON · auditable
What the SDK checks
The photo's SHA-256 must match the event signed by the device key. Re-compression, cropping or a swapped photo is red.
SHA-256 · ES256
RFC 3161 tokens verified down to the CMS signature, ESSCertID, EKU and the certificate chain at genTime. Only a verified time is returned.
RFC 3161 · RFC 5816
Android Key Attestation and Apple App Attest let you enroll only keys that your app created on a genuine device. Proofs from other keys do not turn green.
Key Attestation · App Attest
If the timestamp came more than 60 minutes after the recorded capture time, the result is yellow. The capture time is treated as the device clock's value.
Same rule as the apps
Inclusion in offline Merkle batches is verified. Deletions recorded in the capture history are shown as an unsigned hint.
Merkle · chain context
Verification needs only the proof and the file. No image is sent anywhere.
No network at verify
Honest coverage
Results for photos that carry a proof. For photos without one, the SDK says nothing.
| Attack | Result | Why |
|---|---|---|
| AI edit or inpainting after capture | Red | The photo's hash no longer matches the signature. |
| Re-compression, cropping, a swapped photo | Red | Same. |
| A forged proof made with the attacker's own key and a genuine timestamp | Yellow | Signature and timestamp are valid, but the key is not enrolled. It can never be green. |
| Backdating the capture time | Yellow | The timestamp is more than 60 minutes after the recorded capture time. |
| Swapping or stripping the timestamp, editing the proof | Red | messageImprint, Merkle root or signature no longer match. |
| Someone else's photo, a social-media image | No green | It cannot be sealed by an enrolled key, so no green proof can exist for it. |
| Staged damage, another vehicle | Not detected | A real camera pointed at a false scene verifies. Combine with loss adjusting. |
| Re-photographing an image on a screen | Not judged | The apps' screen checks are recorded as hints; the SDK does not use them. |
| Rooted devices, virtual-camera injection | Partly | Android enrollment requires verified boot and a locked bootloader. Jailbreaks on iOS are not reliably detected. |
| Inflated damage by a repair shop or agent | Not detected | A proof shows only that the business took the photo at that time. |
Results
ANCHOR_VERIFIEDUnchanged since capture, signed by an enrolled key, timestamp fully verified within 60 minutes of the recorded capture time.
PARTIALLY_VERIFIED · ANCHOR_PENDINGNothing failed, but something could not be confirmed: an unknown key, a late timestamp, an untrusted TSA.
SIGNATURE_INVALID · HASH_MISMATCH · ERRORThe photo does not match its proof, or the proof was altered.
A forged proof — AI image, attacker's own key, genuine timestamp — comes out yellow, not green:
Get started
Availability
| Verify SDK (Python) | Available · 0.1.0 (alpha) · Apache-2.0 |
| Device key enrollment (server-side checks for Android and iOS) | Available, included in the SDK |
| Capture SDK (iOS Swift Package / Android AAR) | Design stage · provided per PoC |
| Capture Environment Attestation (CPP v1.7: per-capture App Attest / Play Integrity) | Specification drafted · not implemented |
| C2PA conformance | Expression of interest filed · not certified |
| Tests | 125, including 31 fraud scenarios with real timestamps, and tests against real Android attestation chains |
Disclosure
The SDK is a first-party implementation by VeritasChain Co., Ltd., which shares a founder with the VeritasChain Standards Organization that publishes CPP. It has not been independently audited. As of 25 October 2026 there were no external implementations of CPP and no proof accepted in any proceeding (cpp-spec disclosure).
A proof shows when and on which device something was recorded, and that it has not changed since. It does not show that the picture is true, and it does not guarantee that a court, regulator or insurer will accept it.
Verify SDK 0.1.0 · free
The SDK ships with 31 fraud scenarios and genuine timestamps. For a capture-SDK PoC, or to connect it to your post-hoc detection, write to us.